Abstract* This paper investigates the factors explaining exchange market pressures (EMP) and the hoarding and use of international reserves (IR) by emerging markets during the 2000s, as the Great Moderation turned to the 2008-9 global crisis and great recession. According to our results, both financial and trade factors played important roles, yet the relative magnitude of financial considerations dominated, both during the Great Moderation and during the crisis. The coefficient of gross short-term external debt quintuples during the onset of the crisis, and then gradually declines as we let the crisis window roll forward. Capital outflow (induced by global deleveraging) was the force behind the emerging markets EMP rise during the global financial crisis, with the emerging markets' stock markets themselves only playing a secondary role. In addition, emerging markets were greatly affected by the fall in commodity prices during the initial phase of the crisis, although the relative impact of trade factors remained virtually the same in magnitude during the financial crisis and the Great Moderation period that preceded it. We also study the association between several country-level indicators, as of 2007, and the EMP measure during the height of the crisis in 2008:Q4 in a cross sectional regression. We found that that richer EMs experienced greater EMP during the crisis. Greater FDI inflows prior to the crisis were associated with a lower crisis EMP, while greater portfolio debt inflows with a higher crisis EMP, and this effect is much larger than the mitigation effect associated with greater FDI inflows. We conclude with an analysis of the factors that account for the trade and financial exposure of emerging markets during the crisis, finding that pre-crisis financial and trade openness are significant predictors of the financial and trade shock during the crisis. The severity of the financial shock was further exacerbated by financial ties to the U.S., while the trade shock was more severe in EMs with a larger commodity export share.
Introduction and overview:
The precursor of the global crisis in 2008 has been the remarkable drop in macro volatility and the cost of risk in advanced countries, a period dubbed as the "Great Moderation". 1 The developments in emerging markets have seen two separate phases during the twenty-year period of the Great Moderation.
During the first phase of the Great Moderation (the 1990s), emerging markets (EMs) moved towards deeper financial integration and greater exchange rate flexibility. The growing financial integration, however, exposed emerging markets to a series of virulent financial crises, starting with the Mexican First, these countries were the source of most of the pre-crisis economic growth, and most of the global population lives there. Second, the process of globalization rapidly increased the financial and trade linkages of emerging markets with advanced countries, relative to the limited integration of developing, non EMs countries. Furthermore, the advanced countries have had elastic access to large dollar swap lines extended by the US FED during the crisis (either directly or via FED's large swap line with the ECB). Thereby, most advanced countries were able to meet excess demand for dollar liquidity by borrowing dollar reserves from the FED, facilitating the adjustment to the deleveraging pressures. In contrast, most EMs were not able to rely on borrowed reserves via swap lines, and were thereby more exposed to the need to adjust abruptly to the global crisis.
The body of this paper is an empirical analysis of quarterly panel data during the Great Moderation and the crisis period. We study the developments of exchange market pressure (EMP) for emerging markets, and the role of reserves in them. 2 To recall, exchange market pressure is a weighted sum of exchange rate depreciation and international reserves loss, pioneered by Girton and Roper (1977) , and applied frequently in the analysis of EMs [see Frankel (2009) 2 The literature dealing with EMP in emerging countries during the crisis includes Rose and Spiegel (2009) and Frankel and Saravelos (2010) , focusing on the degree to which leading indicators of financial crises had been useful in assessing country vulnerability; and Aizenman and Hutchison (2010) investigating in a cross country study the extent to which the crisis caused external market pressures in emerging markets, and whether the absorption of the shock was mainly through exchange rate depreciation or the loss of international reserves.
3 A positive (negative) EMP indicates a net excess demand (supply) for foreign currency, alleviated by a combination of reserve loss (gain) and depreciation (appreciation).
During the Great Moderation period, higher EMP is associated with lower income growth, higher inflation, deteriorating trade account and commodities' terms of trade, higher domestic credit growth, net outflows of portfolio investment debt, and a fall in the gross short-term external debt.
During the crisis period, the correlations between the EMP and income, and between the EMP and measures associated with deleveraging (reduction in gross short-term external debt and net portfolio debt inflows) remained significant. Moreover, the coefficient of gross short-term external debt quintupled at the onset of the crisis and then gradually declined. The coefficients suggest that crossborder deleveraging was the main force behind emerging markets' EMP rise during the global financial crisis, with emerging markets' stock markets themselves only playing a secondary role. In addition to cross-border deleveraging, emerging markets were greatly affected by the fall in commodity prices during the initial phase of crisis.
We find suggestive evidence that financial factors played a much greater role in accounting for
EMs hoarding of international reserves both before and during the global crisis. While the correlation between international reserves and financial factors (especially short-term debt) rose sharply during the crisis, the correlation between international reserves and trade factors (trade balance and changes in commodity terms of trade) were similar before and during the crisis. In addition, if we compare the effects of one-standard deviation changes in trade and financial variables on changes in international reserve holdings, we find that financial factors, especially changes in "hot money" inflows, played a much greater role than trade factors in both periods. 4 Specifically, during the Great Moderation period, the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the combined hot money variables on international reserves is more than twice as large as the effect of a one standard deviation increase in trade balance 4 There is no natural unit of comparison, and we use the one-standard deviation change in each variable as the variation in each variable that is likely to occur with similar probability (68 percent).
Sample Characteristics

Emerging Markets
The cross-section consists of 28 EMs selected following Balakrishnan et al. (2009) Moderation period, so for consistency we preserve the same sample of countries.
Identification of the Great Moderation period
While the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the global collapse of stock markets that followed constitute one of the most prominent chapters in the spread of the financial crisis from the U.S. to the world economy, the first signs of distress emerged much earlier. We identify the end of the Great Moderation period based on structural breaks in global risk indicators and an indicator directly linked to emerging markets. The risk measures we consider are the CBOE S&P 500
Options Implied Volatility Index (VIX), the spread between London interbank lending rate and overnight index swap rate (LIBOR-OIS spread), and the average EM sovereign debt spread (EMBI). Girton and Roper (1977) , specification (2) provides a real measure of the loss of international reserves, normalized by the monetary base. We use this measure to check the consistency and robustness of our regression results.
The third measure, EMP (Standardized), is a weighted sum of demeaned percentage nominal exchange rate depreciation and percentage loss of international reserves; the weights are inverses of the historical standard deviation of each series: 
where µ i, Δe and µ i, ΔIR denote historical means of percent nominal depreciation and international percent changes in the holdings of reserves and σ i, Δe and σ i, ΔIR stand for historical standard deviations of these series for emerging market i. 7 We add this measure for consistency checks. However, due to their ease of interpretation, we rely more heavily on the un-weighted measures, equations (1) and (2). Further details on the three EMP measure are available in the appendix. 
Data
We collect quarterly data on emerging markets from 2000:Q1 Ricci et. al (2008) , defined by commodity prices weighted by the shares of each commodity in the country's exports and imports:
where P j is the price index for six commodity categories (food, fuels, agricultural raw materials, metals, gold, and beverages), and X approximately $75 to -$66, and mean stock market quarterly returns fall from 4% to -8%. The average trade balance (% GDP) also deteriorates from a 1% quarterly surplus to zero, and commodity terms of trade (% GDP) show greater volatility (standard deviation of 7% during the crisis compared to 4% before the crisis), with some the most severely hit countries suffering up to a 21% quarterly decline in commodity terms of trade during the crisis. The average net portfolio debt and equity inflows (% GDP) decline to zero during the crisis period with substantial drops in minimum and maximum values compared to the Great Moderation period. FDI inflows exhibit higher volatility (standard deviation of 16% during the crisis compared to 6% during Great Moderation), but show a rise in the average value.
Thus, these less elastic flows were not affected by deleveraging in the same way as portfolio investment flows. The bottom panel of Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the three EMP measures.
Consistently with the trends in Figure 5 , the three EMPs indices rose from negative values during the Great Moderation to positive average values during the crisis period.
Due to the large number of time-series and data limitations we have an unbalanced panel. The most significant limitation arises from the inclusion of gross short-term external debt from QEDS database, with quarterly data unavailable for a number of countries that did not subscribe to the IMF's Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) during the earlier part of the Great Moderation period.
However, gross short-term external debt is an instrumental measurement of "hot money," therefore in the subsequent section we report results keeping gross short-term external debt in the regressions. Table   2 reports simple pair-wise correlations of explanatory variables separately for the Great Moderation and crisis periods. The correlation between change in gross short-term external debt (% GDP) and net portfolio debt inflows (% GDP) is 0.10 (significant at 5% level) before the crisis and 0.11 (not statistically significant) during the crisis, indicating that these two variable proxy for different types of "hot money" flows. Overall, Table 2 shows that during the Great Moderation period a number financial variables are correlated with macro variables such as growth in GDP per capita, CPI inflation, trade balance (% GDP). These correlations, even when significant, rarely exceeds 0.2 in absolute value, indicating that multicollinearity poses little concern in the regression analysis.
4.
Regressions and results
We quantify the statistical and economic importance of financial and trade factors in accounting for exchange market pressure patterns, and the hoarding and use of IR during the Great Moderation and the global crisis period via a series of fixed effects panel regressions. In addition to macro controls we include the variables associated with excess demand for currency stemming from net capital outflows (both debt and equity) and with changes in net imports. Macro controls include growth of GDP per capita, 9 CPI inflation, and the level of domestic credit (% GDP). 10 The main variables of interest are trade and financial factors associated with exchange market pressure and IR hoarding, where we control separately for quantity and price impact in each category. Trade factors are trade balance (% GDP) and percentage change in CTOT, where CTOT controls for the impact of change in commodity prices.
Financial factors are change in gross short-term external debt (% GDP), net portfolio debt inflows (% GDP), net FDI inflows (% GDP), stock market returns, and percentage change in the VIX, where the last two control for price changes in financial markets as well as for global versus local disturbances.
11 Table 3 reports results of regressing EMP on the vector of trade and financial factors and controls. Table 3 shows the negative correlation between EMP and the change in gross short-term external debt (% GDP) through a scatter plot with best linear fit. To illustrate the relative position of emerging markets on the EMP / deleveraging scale, the scatter plot has been coded for each quarter. These results are consistent with the view that during "flight to quality," in less liquid markets, elasticities get smaller in absolute terms, forcing a greater ER adjustment.
13 Figure 6b supplements this analysis of EMP and gross short-term external debt deleveraging with a pre-crisis and crisis period scatter plot (2007:Q4 and 2008:Q4 data) . This year over year comparison eliminates any potential seasonal effects. Table A3 lists the emerging markets in our sample along with the three letter country codes. 15 Table 4 provides a robustness check of these findings, with EMP replaced by EMP (IR/M-Base).
During the Great Moderation period, the coefficients on CPI inflation, trade balance, and commodity terms of trade do not show up as significant, while growth of GDP per capita, domestic credit, shortterm external debt and net portfolio debt inflows remain highly significant, indicating that the pre-crisis association between EMP and deleveraging is robust to the normalization of IR by M1. During the crisis period, all of the variables that are significant in the simple EMP regression remain significant and exhibit similar patterns as the crisis window is rolled forward. The negative and significant coefficients on gross short-term external debt and net portfolio debt inflows during the crisis window confirm the tight link between debt deleveraging and the excess demand for U.S. dollars, which was met by nominal depreciation and IR losses. The coefficient of Commodity Terms of Trade (CTT) is large and highly significant (0.67 in Table 4 compared to 0.27 in Table 3 in absolute value). As the crisis window rolls forward, the coefficient of CTT is replaced with the significant coefficient of Trade Balance (% GDP),
14 Figure 7b supplements this analysis of EMP and portfolio debt deleveraging with a pre-crisis and crisis period scatter plot (2007:Q4 and 2008:Q4 data) . This year over year comparison also eliminates seasonal effects.
15 By construction, a percentage increase (decrease) in the commodity terms of trade measure is approximately equal to the aggregate net trade gain (loss) relative to GDP from changes in real individual commodity prices (see Spatafora and Tytell (2005) ).
indicating that the finding that the adverse trade shock in EMs was initially concentrated in commodities is robust to normalizing IR by M1. Table 5 reports the association between EM's change in international reserves (% GDP) and the same set of financial and trade flows. International reserves is one component of the EMP, but has commanded an independent interest in the external adjustment of emerging markets (e.g. Lee, 2007, and Hutchison, 2010) . During the Great Moderation period there is a positive association between international reserves and trade balance, gross short-term debt, and net portfolio debt inflows. Consistent with both residual hoarding and precautionary hoarding of international reserves, Table 5 indicates that a rise in international reserves is associated with improvements in trade account as well as with inflows of "hot money." The coefficient of gross short-term external debt remains positive and highly statistically significant throughout the crisis period, indicating a tight link between international reserves decumulation and deleveraging. This link, however, is not borne out as tightly in portfolio investment flows, where equity replaces debt during the initial phase of the crisis, then changes signs during the latter phases. Finally, the significant and positive association between the commodities' terms of trade and international reserves holdings throughout the crisis period, indicates that some emerging markets also used their reserves in response to the burst of the commodity bubble that accompanied the global financial crisis. The coefficients on commodities' terms of trade are robust to the exclusion of the trade balance (results omitted for brevity). The negative coefficient of the trade balance during the crisis window specifications (2) and (4) may reflect different reserve management policy between commodity exporters and the rest of emerging markets, and the importance of the commodity price shock, in particular during the 2008-9 crisis.
The regression coefficients on trade balance, on commodities' terms of trade and on the variables associated with "hot money" (gross short-term external debt and portfolio debt) allow us to evaluate the Table 3 we obtain 0.016 (or 1.6%). This indicates that a one standard deviation improvement in the trade balance during the Great Moderation period translated on average into a 1.6% increase in international reserves. Analogously, a one standard deviation increase in the gross short-term external debt (0.04) was associated with 1.2% higher reserve holdings, and a one standard deviation increase in net portfolio debt inflows (also 0.04) was associated with 2.5% higher reserve holdings. Overall, during the Great Moderation period the combined impact of a one standard deviation increase in significant hot money variables on reserves is more than two times greater than that of significant trade variables (3.7% versus 1.6%).
During the financial crisis window, commodities' terms of trade replaced trade balance as the significant and robust trade variable associated with changes in international reserve holdings. Focusing on the 2008:Q1-2008:Q4 crisis window, we find that a one standard deviation decline in the commodity terms of trade (0.07) was associated with a 1.2% decline in international reserve holdings relative to GDP, while a one standard deviation decrease in gross short-term external debt (deleveraging, also 0.07) was associated with a 6.3% decline in international reserve holdings relative to GDP. Hence, the relative impact of trade considerations on international reserves has shifted to the commodities sector and slightly declined in magnitude during the financial crisis compared to the Great Moderation period. In contrast, the relative impact of "hot money" flows almost doubled during the height of the global financial crisis (2008:Q1-2008:Q4) compared to the Great Moderation period. Table 6 reports the determinants of the absorption of EMP via international reserve depletion, with and without interaction dummies for positive EMP. Specifically, the dependent variable is The coefficient of gross short-term external debt conditional on positive EMP is negative, indicating that a greater deleveraging pressure (a lower gross short-term external debt to GDP ratio) was accommodated by increasing the weight of international reserves relative to exchange rate depreciation.
The coefficient of gross short-term external debt is significant during both the Great Moderation and the 2008-9 crisis period, and is slightly higher in magnitude during the crisis period (5.9 in absolute value Having examined the contemporaneous relationship between EMP, and its components with other variables, we now ask a slightly different question. How did the developments before the crisis, during the 2000s part of the Great Moderation period, contribute to the depth of the crisis? We first explore how the situations right before the crisis was related to the EMP during the crisis. The coefficient of pre-crisis GDP per capita is positive and significant in all but one specification, indicating that richer emerging markets, presumably more financially integrated, experienced greater EMP during the crisis. CPI inflation is also a significant predictor of EMP during the crisis in three of the four EMP dependent variables used, indicating that emerging markets with higher inflation rates prior to the crisis experienced greater EMP during the crisis.
Trade balance has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant in six out of eight specifications,
indicating that net exporters of goods and services experienced lower EMP during the crisis.
Turning to the decomposition of financial linkages, greater FDI inflows prior to the crisis is Additional variables for cross-sectional regressions are described in Table A2 . 18 We also considered EM pre-crisis sovereign debt spreads as an additional explanatory variable. If emerging economies that undertook fiscal improvement measures that resulted in the drop of EMBI during the Great Moderation where less vulnerable to the crisis, we would expect a negative coefficient on pre-crisis EMBI in the regression on the crisis EMP. It turned out that EMBI was insignificant under all specifications (results omitted for brevity), indicating once again that fiscal consolidation measures had little if any effect of reducing the vulnerability of EMs to a global deleveraging crisis.
By comparison, the coefficients on FDI inflows, although offsetting, are an order of magnitude smaller, indicating that "hot money" flows where the dominant financial determinant of the emerging markets' exposure to the crisis.
Specifications (2), (4), (6), and (8) include an interaction term between the pre-crisis financial openness (as measured by the Chinn-Ito index), KAOPEN, and net portfolio debt inflows. We find partial evidence that greater financial openness exacerbated the link between portfolio debt deleveraging and EMP during the crisis, as indicated by positive and significant interaction terms in regressions (4) and ( (sum of exports and imports vis-a-vis the U.S. over the total exports plus imports), and the commodities' share in exports. 19 In addition, we consider the possible nonlinear relations between financial and trade openness and EM exposure to the shocks, including adding interactions and squared terms of financial and trade openness. Table 8 network (see Kimura et al. (2007) ). The contrast between exporters of commodities, the prices of which dropped substantially during the crisis, and network trade in component, whose prices adjusted downwards at a lower rate, may account for the non linear patterns depicted in Figure 9 . The coefficient of the squared financial openness term in the financial shock equation is negative and insignificant, indicating that the relationship between financial openness and exposure to financial shocks is positive irrespective of an emerging markets' degree of financial integration.
Specifications (4) and (5) focus on financial and trade exposure to the U.S. Due to data limitations on the U.S. banks' external claims and liabilities at the country level, the sample is reduced from 27 to 18 emerging markets. The coefficient of financial exposure to the U.S. banking sector in regression (4) is approximately 0.6. Thus, a 10 percentage points higher sum of assets and liabilities of an EM in U.S. banks relative to its total external financial assets and liabilities, is associated with a 6
percentage points of greater deleveraging during the crisis (measured by the reduction in the stock of net portfolio investment liabilities relative to GDP). The coefficient of trade exposure to the U.S. is 0.07, indicating that a 10 percentage points higher share of trade with the U.S. is associated with a 0.7 percentage points greater deterioration of trade balance relative to the GDP during the crisis period.
Including commodities' share in exports, however, makes the coefficients on the U.S. trade and financial links insignificant. While low degrees of freedom are of some concern, the reliance on commodities exports (and by extension a heavy degree of concentration in trade) serves as a more robust predictor of the severity of crisis-period trade shock than the direct exposure to the U.S. The negative coefficients on EMBI in the financial shock regression are consistent with the deleveraging hypothesis, as a higher pre-crisis EMBI would have reduced "hot money" inflows to the extent that it would have signaled greater sovereign risk and worse fiscal health of an emerging market. This finding illustrates the difficult choices facing the emerging markets. On the one hand, a number of emerging markets earned the drop in their risk premium during the Great Moderation period by improving their balance sheet, solidifying their tax base, and rationalizing their public expenditure. On the other hand, lower risk premiums, by attracting more "hot money" inflows, exposed them to the global deleveraging crisis of 2008-09.
Overall, the SUR analysis of the determinants of financial and trade shocks indicates that greater EM integration into the world economy was associated with severer deleveraging and a negative trade balance shock during the crisis. Economic ties to the U.S. are particularly important, especially as predictors of the financial shock, while greater reliance on commodity exports shows a robust association with higher trade shock. Finally, a negative association between the pre-crisis sovereign risk premium and the financial shock points at the tradeoff between achieving lower risk premiums to attract foreign investment and exposing one's economy to a deleveraging crisis.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we looked at the economic and statistical importance of financial and trade factors in accounting for Exchange Market Pressure patterns, and the hoarding and use of IR during the Great Moderation period and the global crisis of 2008-9. To recall, the fast financial integration of emerging markets during the 1990s exposed them to significant debt deleveraging propagated by the US during the crisis of 2008-9. In addition, the rapid increase in EMs trade openness exposed them to the adverse effects of the collapsing international trade. We trace the impact of the financial and the trade factors in a panel regression using quarterly data. We found that both factors are important, yet the economic size of the financial factors dominates that of trade factors, especially during the crisis. 
(1) Growth in GDP per capita 1 (2) CPI Inflation Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate correlations significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively; balanced sample (list-wise missing value deletion). Panel explanatory variables for regressions reported in Tables 3, 4 , 5, and 7. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate correlations significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Country spreads (EMBI) were excluded from the main regressions because of the lack of statistical significance. If we exclude Change in Gross Short-Term External Debt (%GDP) from the regressions then positive and significant coefficient of EMBI observed during the 2008:Q1-2009:Q2 period only. We interpret this as further evidence that EMs absorbed the financial stress through quantity (not price) adjustments in the debt markets. Notes: *, **, and *** indicate correlations significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Note: the least squares quadratic fit to the scatter plot confirms more formal regression results indicating that the association between the size of the trade shock and pre-crisis level of openness turns from positive to negative for countries with higher level of openness. 
